SP Trainings : MPLS for Dummies , Large Route Leak Detection , Secure BGP
English
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Genre: eLearning
Videos training MPLS For Dummies, BGP Prefix Origin Validation, Large Route Leak Detection, How Secure are Secure BGP Protocols.
MPLS For Dummies
A giant tutorial on how MPLS works, how ISPs can benefit from it, and techniques for using it.
BGP Prefix Origin Validation
This presentation will provide an introduction to the ongoing work on BGP prefix origin validation. As has been discussed in NANOG before and witnessed by several incidents in the past, prefix hijacking in BGP is a real issue. In conjunction with the SIDR working group at IETF, a framework has been designed and implemented to validate the origination AS of BGP routes. The slides will touch upon the implementation details and deployment models.
Pradosh Mohapatra Biography:
Pradosh Mohapatra works in the core routing business unit at Cisco systems where his focus is on building the next-generation core routing platform and operating system. His expertise lies in routing protocols where he has wide implementation experience with BGP, IS-IS, and LDP. Prior to joining Cisco, Pradosh worked at Procket Networks as a protocol developer.
Large Route Leak Detection
Prefix hijacking, in which an unauthorized network announces IP prefixes of other networks, is a major threat to the Internet routing security. Existing detection systems either generate many false positives, requiring frequent human intervention, or are designed to protect a small number of specific prefixes. Therefore they are not suitable to protect data traffic at networks other than the prefix owner during on-going hijacks.
We design and implement a system that detects a specific type of prefix hijacking, large route leaks, at real time and without requiring authoritative prefix ownership information.
In a large route leak, an unauthorized network hijacks prefixes owned by multiple different networks. By correlating suspicious routing announcements along the time dimension and comparing with a network’s past behavior, we are able to identify a network’s abnormal behavior of offending multiple other networks at the same time. Applying the detection algorithm to routing data from 2003 through 2009, we identify five to twenty large route leaks every year. They typically hijack prefixes owned by a few tens of other networks, last from a few minutes to a few hours, and pollute routes at most vantage points of the data collector.
In 2009 there are nine events detected, none of which was mentioned on operator mailing lists, but all of them are confirmed through our communication with individual operators of affected networks. The system can take real-time routing data feed and conduct the detection quickly, enabling automated response to these attacks without requiring authoritative prefix ownership information or human intervention.
Beichuan Zhang Biography:
Beichuan Zhang is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science
at the University of Arizona. His research interests include Internet routing architectures and protocols, network topology, content distribution, and network security. He received Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of California, Los
Angeles (2003) and B.S. from Peking University, China (1995).
How Secure are Secure BGP Protocols
A decade of research has been devoted to addressing vulnerabilities in BGP. The result is a plethora of BGP security proposals, each providing different types of security guarantees. To inform decisions about which of these protocols should be deployed in the Internet, we *quantify* and *compare* the ability of these protocols to blunt BGP "traffic attraction" attacks, namely, when an attacker manipulates BGP messages to blackhole traffic (e.g. prefix hijacks a la AS7007, Pakistan Telecom/YouTube), or intercept traffic (e.g. BGP man-in-the-middle attacks a la Pilosov & Kapela). We run simulations of traffic flow on maps of the Internet’s AS-level topology to determine and compare the impact of attacks on different BGP security protocols. The key implication of our work is that route filtering can be as effective as cryptographic routing protocols like Secure BGP (S-BGP) and secure origin BGP (soBGP).
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